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2. FB's writings on Law

2.6. FB's writings on Consumer Credit Law

2.6.4. Multiple agreements under the Consumer Credit Act 1974 s.18

 

Note

 

The treatment of section 18 contains the following-

 

I Article by Francis Bennion published in Consumer Credit Control via Release 49 (1999).

II Francis Bennion’s Addendum to the above on National Westminster Bank PLC v Anthony John Story and Mary Pallister, published in Consumer Credit Control via Release 50 (1999).

III Letter by Professor Paul Dobson in New Law Journal (1999).

IV Comment by Sir Francis Ferris in Goshawk Dedicated (No 2) Ltd v Governor and Company of the Bank of Scotland [2005] EWHC 2906 (Ch), [2006] 2 All ER 610, at [89]


I

 

1999.004 'Multiple Agreements Under the Consumer Credit Act 1974'

 

I have written this article to explain the intended application of section 18 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974, which deals with multiple agreements. It seems desirable to do this in view of the widespread misapprehension concerning section 18 1.

 

Purposes of section 18

 

Section 18 is both an anti-avoidance provision and a clarifying provision. In pursuit of the first purpose, it seeks to prevent credit grantors and hirers from evading the Act by combining in one agreement transactions it intends to regulate with others it does not. In pursuit of the second purpose, it states the consequences of the obvious fact that the whole or parts of a single agreement, even when it is not designed for evasion of the Act, will often fall into more than one category. It spells out what under earlier legislation had been left to the court to divine, and should be taken as declaratory of what the courts might have been expected to lay down even without its guidance 2.

 

The expression ‘multiple agreement’ is defined by section 18(1) as an agreement whose terms are such as-

‘(a) to place a part of it within one category of agreement mentioned in this Act, and another part of it within a different category of agreement so mentioned, or within a category of agreement not so mentioned, or

(b) to place it, or a part of it, within two or more categories of agreement so mentioned.’

 

The clue to the meaning of this lies in the fact that the Act and its accompanying subordinate legislation make use of a large number of classifications of credit and hire agreements. Section 18(1) refers to each of these as ‘a category of agreement mentioned in this Act’, a phrase which should also be taken to embrace categories of agreement mentioned in subordinate legislation made under the Act 3. I will refer to all of these as ‘CCA categories’. Section 18(1) also refers to categories of agreement not mentioned in the Act, which I will refer to as ‘non-CCA categories’.

 

The wording of section 18(1) is highly compressed statutory language. It applies cumulatively, that is both paragraph (a) and paragraph (b) can apply to the same agreement. Pulling the language apart, we can say that each of the following is a ‘multiple agreement’.

 

1. An agreement whose terms are such as to place one part of it (‘part A’) within one CCA category and another part of it (‘part B’) within a different CCA category 4.

 

2. An agreement whose terms are such as to place one part of it (‘part C’) within a CCA category and another part of it (‘part D’) within a non-CCA category 5.

 

3. An agreement whose terms are such as to place the whole of it within two or more CCA categories 6.

 

4. An agreement whose terms are such as to place a part of it (‘part E’) within two or more CCA categories 7.

 

The same agreement can fall into two or more of these four classes. I will refer to agreements falling within them as Class 1, Class 2, Class 3 and Class 4 agreements respectively. It may be wondered why there is not a fifth class, designating an agreement whose terms are such as to place the whole of it within a CCA category and also within a non-CCA category. This is ignored by section 18 because it does not need mentioning. The fact that the whole of an agreement falls within a non-CCA category is ex hypothesi irrelevant to the working of the Act, whether or not the whole of the agreement also falls within

one or more CCA categories. There is therefore no need for section 18 to say anything about it.

 

What is a ‘category of agreement’?

 

Section 18 can be understood only if the nature of a ‘category of agreement’ is grasped. The expression is not defined in the Act, and has caused difficulty. It was not defined because it is intended to be infinitely flexible: it means whatever the context requires it to mean.

 

The potential meaning of the phrase can be grasped by supposing that a list were compiled of every type of agreement ‘mentioned in the Act’, that is every possible ‘CCA category’. The Act begins to mention types of agreement in section 8. Starting the list there, one would get the following CCA categories: personal credit agreement, consumer credit agreement, regulated agreement and exempt agreement. Going on to section 9 one would add hire-purchase agreement. Section 10 refers to ‘running-account credit’ rather than ‘a running-account credit agreement’. This variation in wording does not make any difference to the operation of the principle. A personal credit agreement which provides running-account credit is a distinct ‘category of agreement mentioned in this Act’ within the meaning of section 18. Wherever the Act says something specific about a certain sort of agreement, in whatever way it says it, that creates a ‘CCA category’.

 

This is perfectly plain, so it is puzzling that commentators have had difficulty with it. Professor Goode says that the phrase ‘category of agreement mentioned in this Act’ is susceptible of two different interpretations, one confined to agreements mentioned in Part II of the Act and the other going wider.8 This view is untenable under the principles applicable to statutory interpretation, since there is no reason why the plain words ‘mentioned in this Act’ should be construed as if they read ‘mentioned in Part II of this Act’. Professor Goode’s suggested alternative meaning, namely a class of agreement ‘accorded distinct legal treatment by the Act’, is obviously the correct one.

 

In their note to section 18 Guest and Lloyd also seek to read in words that are not present in the Act. The note says the reference to two or more categories ‘must mean disparate categories, otherwise all agreements would be multiple’. They go on to say that even the simplest credit agreement necessarily falls within two or more categories, ‘e.g. personal credit agreement, consumer credit agreement, regulated agreement etc’. This is obviously correct, but it does not affect the plain meaning of section 18 or hinder its operation in any way. It provides no justifiable ground for reading in restrictive words not included by the draftsman. Echoing Guest and Lloyd, A. H. Macdonald said-

‘Every regulated agreement must be either fixed sum or running account: every regulated agreement must be either debtor-creditor or debtor-creditor-supplier. If those are categories, then every regulated agreement falls into two categories and so every regulated agreement must be multiple. The Act can’t mean that.’9

The Act does mean that. However the effect is not as troublesome as these commentators think. All section 18 says about say a fixed-sum debtor-creditor agreement is that it is to be treated as an agreement in both of those categories. It is a fixed-sum credit agreement, and it is a debtor-creditor agreement. So any provision of the Act expressed in terms of fixed-sum credit applies to it, and any provision expressed in terms of debtor-creditor agreements applies to it. That is only what one would expect. The agreement is a multiple agreement, but this presents no practical problems.

 

What the Act says about each of the relevant types of agreement has effect in relation to any multiple agreement, and theoretically it (together with the subordinate legislation) has to be considered in relation to each relevant agreement in turn. In practice this is not necessary. The experienced practitioner quickly perceives what is required. If for example one of the relevant types of agreement is ‘exempt agreement’ nothing more is needed: the Act does not apply. If one of the types is ‘regulated agreement’, then all that is needed is to comply with the requirements relating to the relevant type of regulated agreement. And so on.

 

What needs to be understood (and has been misunderstood by many commentators) is that section 18 has a practical effect only where it needs to have one, and can otherwise be ignored. It is a common technique of the parliamentary drafter to operate in this way 10.

 

Subsections (2) to (4) of section 18

 

The sole purpose of mentioning a particular type of agreement in the Act is to lay down rules for an agreement which lies within the category indicated, but only so far as it lies within it. A

 

continued........................

-------------------------------------------------------

 

1. I am grateful to Professor Paul Dobson for help in updating an early draft of this article, which I began writing some years ago.
2. See, e.g., Mutual Finance Ltd. v Davidson [1963] 1 WLR 134, discussed below.
3. Here I have to admit that as well as referring to categories of agreement mentioned (or not mentioned) in the Act, section 18 should also have referred to categories mentioned (or not mentioned) in subordinate legislation made under the Act. Since however the section is, as explained above, to be looked on as declaratory of the position which the courts ought to arrive at without its benefit, it is submitted that it would be a correct construction to regard the phrase ‘mentioned in this Act’ as if it read ‘mentioned in this Act or in regulations or orders made under this Act’.
4. Section 18(1)(a), first portion.
5. Section 18(1)(a), second portion.
6. Section 18(1)(b), first portion.
7. Section 18(1)(b), second portion.
8. Consumer Credit Legislation, paragraph 561.
9. Credit, April 1986, page 20.
10. It is known as weightless drafting: see Bennion, ‘Threading the Legislative Maze - 6’ 162 JP [1998] 856.

 

 
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